• PNCT will be CLOSED in observance of the following holiday: 11/11 Veterans Day
   
• Maher Terminals will be CLOSED for Veteran's Day, 11/11
   

CSMS # 62912824 - DHS Places New Additions to Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

UFLPA Entity List Will Now Restrict Goods from 78 PRC-Based Companies from Entering the United States

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the addition of textile companies based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. The additions reinforce DHS’s commitment to eradicate forced labor and ensure accountability for the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Effective November 1, 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will apply a rebuttable presumption that goods produced by Esquel Group, Guangdong Esquel Textile Co., Ltd., and Turpan Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. will be prohibited from entering the United States. The addition of these textile entities builds on DHS’s Textile Enforcement Plan and demonstrates the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force's (FLETF) commitment to focus on entities in high priority sectors for enforcement under the UFLPA Strategy, including the apparel and cotton and cotton products sectors. In addition to this announcement, Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. will also be removed from one section of the UFLPA Entity Lists and added to another. Goods produced by Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. (also known as Changji Yida Textile Co., Ltd.) will continue to be subject to a rebuttable presumption that they are prohibited from entering the United States.

“Through today’s expansion of the Entity List, we enable American businesses to better assess their supply chains and ensure they do not profit, directly or indirectly, from the use of forced labor,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Our Department will continue to aggressively enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and, in doing so, we stand up for human rights, safeguard a free and fair marketplace, and hold perpetrators accountable.”

The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) – chaired by DHS and whose member agencies also include the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, Labor, State, and the Treasury – has now added 78 entities to the UFLPA Entity List since the UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021. The UFLPA Entity List includes companies that are active in the apparel, agriculture, polysilicon, plastics, chemicals, batteries, household appliances, electronics, seafood and textile sectors, among others. Identifying these additional entities provides U.S. importers with more information to conduct due diligence and examine their supply chains for risks of forced labor to ensure compliance with the UFLPA.

“We are uncompromising in removing forced labor from U.S. supply chains,” said Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers, who serves as chair of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force. “Our enforcement efforts are yielding results. Our Administration is committed to advancing this momentum and strengthening accountability across global supply chains.”

The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that the below entities meet the criteria for inclusion in the UFLPA Entity List under Section 2(d)(2)(B)(v) of the UFLPA, which identifies facilities and entities that source material from the XUAR or from persons working with the government of XUAR or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for the purposes of the “poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing assistance” program or any other government labor scheme that uses forced labor.

Esquel Group (also known as Esquel China Holdings Limited) is a Hong Kong-based vertically integrated textile and apparel company that engages in cotton research, as well as ginning, spinning, knitting, weaving of cotton and cotton products, in the production of textiles, apparel and accessories, including packaging and merchandising of these products. Esquel Group includes a variety of subsidiaries also involved in cotton, textile, clothing, and other products manufacturing, production, and sales, including Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd., Turpan Esquel Textile Co., Ltd., and Guangdong Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, including publicly available information, that Esquel Group sources cotton from the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Esquel Group satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in Section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Guangdong Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. is a company based in Foshan City, Guangdong Province, that is engaged in the manufacture and processing of textiles and apparel. The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, including publicly available information, that Guangdong Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. sources cotton from the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Guangdong Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in Section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Turpan Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. is a company based in Turpan City, in the XUAR that is engaged in the production and sales of cotton and cotton yarn. The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, including publicly available information, that Turpan Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. is sourcing cotton from the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Turpan Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in Section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. (also known as Changji Yida Textile Co., Ltd.) is a company based in Changji Prefecture, XUAR that is engaged in production and sales of cotton yarn. The company had been included as one of the original twenty entities named to the UFLPA Entity List in June 2022 as an entity that qualified for inclusion under Section 2(d)(2)(B)(i) of the UFLPA. The FLETF has removed Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. from Section 2(d)(2)(B)(i) of the UFLPA Entity List as the FLETF has determined there is no longer reasonable cause to believe that Changji Esquel Textile Co. meets the criteria described in Section 2(d)(2)(B)(i) of the UFLPA. The FLETF, however, has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, including publicly available information, that Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. sources cotton from the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in Section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

The bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, signed into law by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in December 2021, mandates that CBP apply a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR or produced by entities identified on the UFLPA Entity List are prohibited from importation into the United States unless the Commissioner of CBP determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the goods were not produced with forced labor. CBP began enforcing the UFLPA in June 2022. Since then, CBP has reviewed over 9,700 shipments valued at more than $3.5 billion under the UFLPA. Additionally, Homeland Security Investigations, through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, conducts criminal investigations into those engaging in or otherwise knowingly benefitting from forced labor, and collaborates with international partners to seek justice for victims.

Today’s announcement supports President Biden’s Memorandum on Advancing Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally. The memorandum represents the first whole-of-government approach to advance workers’ rights by directing federal agencies engaged abroad to advance international recognized labor rights, which includes DHS’s work implementing the UFLPA.

Posted:
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/10/31/dhs-places-additional-prc-based-textile-companies-uflpa-entity-list.
 

CBP issues Withhold Release Order against Asli Maydi - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

Agency will detain imports of frankincense and frankincense-based products produced using forced labor

WASHINGTON — U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a withhold release order (WRO) against Asli Maydi, a frankincense supplier based in Somaliland, based on information that reasonably indicates the use of forced labor in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1307 in the production of merchandise.

Effective immediately, CBP personnel at all U.S. ports of entry will detain frankincense and frankincense-based products sourced from Somalia by Asli Maydi. These products are commonly used in essential oils for fragrance and skincare.

CBP identified the following International Labour Organization forced labor indicators during its investigation of Asli Maydi: deception, physical violence, abusive working conditions, intimidation and threats, and withholding of wages.

“Trading in goods made with forced labor is in direct opposition to American values. When goods are manufactured at the cost of someone’s health, safety, or freedom, we all lose,” said CBP Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner Troy A. Miller. “CBP will continue to pursue aggressive enforcement actions to hold unscrupulous businesses, importers, and manufacturers around the world accountable.”

 “With this action, we are sending a message to those who continue to disregard basic human rights: your goods are not welcome in the United States,” said Executive Assistant Commissioner of CBP Office of Trade, AnnMarie R. Highsmith.

This WRO is CBP’s latest action to address forced labor and other human rights abuses around the world. With this WRO issuance, CBP currently oversees and enforces 52 WROs and eight Findings under 19 U.S.C. § 1307.

The International Labour Organization estimates that nearly 28 million workers suffer under conditions of forced labor worldwide. Forced labor exposes vulnerable populations to inhumane working conditions and hurts American workers and law-abiding businesses who cannot compete with forced labor goods that are sold below market value.

19 U.S.C. § 1307 prohibits the importation of “[a]ll goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor, or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions.” This also includes forced or indentured child labor. When CBP has information reasonably indicating that imported goods are made by forced labor in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1307 and are being, or are likely to be, imported into the United States, the agency will order personnel at U.S. ports of entry to detain shipments of those goods. Such shipments will be excluded or subjected to seizure and forfeiture if the importer fails to demonstrate proof of admissibility in accordance with the applicable regulations.

CBP receives allegations of forced labor from a variety of sources including private citizens, government agencies, media, non-government organizations, and witnesses. Any person or organization that has reason to believe merchandise produced with the use of forced labor is being, or is likely to be, imported into the United States, can report detailed allegations by contacting CBP through the e-Allegations Online Trade Violation Reporting System or by calling 1-800-BE-ALERT.
 

Federal Register Notices:

• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Thermoformed Molded Fiber Products From the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations
• Hexamethylenetetramine From the People's Republic of China and India: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations
• Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Determinations, Investigations, etc.: Aluminum Extrusions From Indonesia: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Correction
• Hexamethylenetetramine From the People's Republic of China, Germany, India, and Saudi Arabia: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations
• Thermoformed Molded Fiber Products From the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Persulfates From China; Scheduling of an Expedited Five-Year Review
• Overhead Door Counterbalance Torsion Springs From China and India; Notice of Institution of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations and Scheduling of Preliminary Phase Investigations
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Quartz Surface Products From India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Barium Chloride From the People's Republic of China and India: Final Results of Changed Circumstances Reviews and Revocation of the Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Orders
• Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From Germany: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation; Advance Notification of Sunset Review
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain TOPCon Solar Cells, Modules, Panels, Components Thereof, and Products Containing Same; Institution of Investigation
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Laminated Woven Sacks From China; Scheduling of Expedited Five-Year Reviews
• Steel Wheels From China; Determinations
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From Malaysia: Amended Preliminary Determination of Countervailing Duty Investigation
• Large Diameter Welded Pipe From the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Stilbenic Optical Brightening Agents From China and Taiwan; Scheduling of Expedited Five-Year Reviews
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Persulfates From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Fifth Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Polyester Textured Yarn From Indonesia: Notice of Court Decision Not in Harmony With the Final Determination of Antidumping Investigation; Notice of Amended Final Determination; Notice of Amended Order
• Laminated Woven Sacks From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Third Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Steel Propane Cylinders From the People's Republic of China and Thailand: Final Results of the Expedited Sunset Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders
• Silicomanganese From the People's Republic of China and Ukraine: Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders
• Stilbenic Optical Brightening Agents From the People's Republic of China and Taiwan: Final Results of the Expedited Second Sunset Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders
• Certain Mobile Access Equipment and Subassemblies Thereof From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
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Treasury Expands Sanctions on Republika Srpska Network Evading U.S. Sanctions - Department of Treasury

WASHINGTON — Today (11/6/24), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating one individual and one entity who support a corrupt patronage network in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that is attempting to evade U.S. sanctions. This network is directly linked to U.S.-designated Igor Dodik (Igor), the son of Milorad Dodik (Dodik), the U.S.-designated President of BiH’s Republika Srpska (RS), one of two entities that make up BiH. For years, Dodik has used his official position to accumulate personal wealth through companies linked to himself and Igor. This corruption has contributed to an undermining of public confidence in BiH state institutions and the rule of law. 

“RS President Milorad Dodik, his associates, and his enablers continue to use their privileged position to erode public confidence in the regional peace frameworks and institutions that have brought stability and security to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Bradley T. Smith. “The United States remains committed to exposing the efforts of Dodik and his family to maintain their corrupt patronage networks.” 

Today’s action bolsters previous designations against the Dodiks by exposing Igor’s blatant attempts to evade U.S. sanctions and targeting the individuals who enable the family’s activities that hinder democratic development in the RS. 

IGOR DODIK’S FINANCIAL NETWORK AND ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE EFFECTS OF U.S. SANCTIONS

The United States designated Dodik on January 5, 2022 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, a violation of, or an act that has obstructed or threatened the implementation of, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), as well as for corrupt activities. The United States also previously designated Dodik on July 17, 2017 pursuant to E.O. 13304 for obstructing or threatening to obstruct the DPA. Additionally, the United States designated Dodik’s adult children, Igor and Gorica Dodik, on October 20, 2023 pursuant to E.O. 14033 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Dodik, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14033.

The Dodiks’ efforts to enrich themselves led to OFAC’s October 20, 2023 and June 18, 2024 designations of core parts of the Dodiks’ corrupt patronage network, including several entities and individuals under Igor’s direct control. Since the designations, the Dodik network has pursued an aggressive strategy to attempt to circumvent the effects of sanctions, namely by restructuring and reestablishing corporate entities to obfuscate his control and transfer company assets from designated entities. 

Dodik used his official position to direct RS government contracts to a network of private companies that he and Igor oversee. While Igor controls many of the companies in this network, he obfuscates his personal connection to the companies by relying on distinct nominal owners and directors. One of these individuals is Vladimir Perisic (Perisic), the general director of Prointer ITSS (Prointer), designated by OFAC on June 18, 2024. As the general director of Prointer — an entity controlled by Igor — Perisic provided updates to Igor, solicited Igor’s approval and guidance, and executed business decisions based on Igor’s instructions. Additionally, Perisic proposed and followed through on a corrupt kickback scheme involving Prointer after receiving instructions and approval from Igor.

After Kaldera Company’s (Kaldera) designation on June 18, 2024, Igor directed U.S.-designated Milenko Cicic (Cicic) (designated on June 18, 2024) to establish Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi (Elpring), which would serve as a replacement for Kaldera. With Igor’s approval, Cicic established Elpring and coordinated the transfer of all of Kaldera’s assets and operations, to include Kaldera’s employees, to Elpring. Throughout this process, Cicic routinely requested Igor’s approval to make key business decisions and ensured that both Igor and himself would have an account for Elpring which they could exercise control over.

Perisic and Elpring are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Igor, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14033.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as from engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation.

In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. 

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

For identifying information on the individuals and entities sanctioned today, click here.
 

Proposed Modifications of one Ruling Letter and Proposed Revocation of Treatment Relating to the Tariff Classification of Women's Pants - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of proposed modification of one ruling letter and proposed revocation of treatment relating to the tariff classification of women’s pants.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 625(c), Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)), as amended by section 623 of title VI (Customs Modernization) of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057), this notice advises interested parties that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) intends to modify one ruling letter concerning tariff classification of women’s pants (style GTGH-24388) under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Similarly, CBP intends to revoke any treatment previously accorded by CBP to substantially identical transactions. Comments on the correctness of the proposed actions are invited.

DATE: Comments must be received on or before November 30, 2024.

ADDRESS: Written comments are to be addressed to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Trade, Regulations and Rulings, Attention: Shannon L. Stillwell, Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division, 90 K St., NE, 10th Floor, Washington, DC 20229–1177. CBP is also allowing commenters to submit electronic comments to the following email address: 1625Comments@cbp.dhs. gov. All comments should reference the title of the proposed notice at issue and the Customs Bulletin volume, number and date of publication. Arrangements to inspect submitted comments should be made in advance by calling Ms. Shannon L. Stillwell at (202) 325–0739.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Parisa Ghazi, Food, Textiles, and Marking Branch, Regulations and Rulings, Office of Trade, at (202) 325–0272.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
 

Treasury Takes Aim at Third-Country Sanctions Evaders and Russian Producers Supporting Russia’s Military Industrial Base - Department of the Treasury

Sanctions target individuals and entities in 17 jurisdictions; Deputy Secretary calls on countries to take similar action against enablers of Russia’s military-industrial base

WASHINGTON — Today (10/30/24), the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned 275 individuals and entities involved in supplying Russia with advanced technology and equipment that it desperately needs to support its war machine. Today’s action targets both individual actors and sprawling sanctions evasion networks across 17 jurisdictions, including India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Switzerland, Thailand, and Türkiye. In addition to disrupting global evasion networks, this action also targets domestic Russian importers and producers of key inputs and other materiel for Russia’s military-industrial base.

“The United States and our allies will continue to take decisive action across the globe to stop the flow of critical tools and technologies that Russia needs to wage its illegal and immoral war against Ukraine,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo. “As evidenced by today’s action, we are unyielding in our resolve to diminish and degrade Russia’s ability to equip its war machine and stop those seeking to aid their efforts through circumvention or evasion of our sanctions and export controls.”

The Department of State is also targeting sanctions evasion and circumvention in multiple third countries, including several PRC-based companies exporting dual-use goods that fill critical gaps in Russia’s military-industrial base and entities and individuals in Belarus related to the Lukashenka regime’s support for Russia’s defense industry. State is also targeting several senior Russian Ministry of Defense officials and defense companies and those supporting Russia’s future energy production and exports.

Read entire article here
 

DOE and Commerce Department Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Advance Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI - Department of Energy

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), as represented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed earlier this year to collaborate on safety research, testing, and evaluation of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models and systems.  

This partnership is a key example of the Biden-Harris Administration’s whole-of-government approach to ensuring the safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of AI. This announcement follows the recent release of the first-ever National Security Memorandum on AI, which designated the U.S. AI Safety Institute (US AISI), which is housed within NIST, as a key hub of the U.S. government’s AI safety efforts and identifies a substantial role for DOE in helping the U.S. government understand and mitigate AI safety risks and improve the performance and reliability of AI models and systems. 

“There’s no question that AI is the next frontier for scientific and clean energy breakthroughs, which underscores the Biden-Harris Administration’s efforts to push forward scientific innovation in a safe and secure manner” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm. “Across the federal government we are committed to advancing AI safety and today’s partnership ensures that Americans can confidently benefit from AI-powered innovation and prosperity for years to come.” 

In addition to facilitating joint research efforts and information sharing, this agreement enables the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories to lend both their technical capacity and their subject matter expertise to the US AISI and NIST. 

“By empowering our teams to work together, this partnership with the Department of Energy will undoubtedly help the U.S. AI Safety Institute and NIST advance the science of AI safety,” said U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo. “Safety is key to continued innovation in AI, and we have no time to waste in working together across government to develop robust research, testing, and evaluations to protect and advance essential national security priorities.” 

Through this MOU, the DOE and DOC intend to evaluate the impact of AI models on public safety, including risks to critical infrastructure, energy security, and national security. Key focus areas include developing classified evaluations of advanced AI models’ chemical and biological risks, as well as developing and evaluating evaluate privacy enhancing technologies that aim to protect personal and commercial proprietary data. These efforts, combined with DOE’s AI testbeds, will help lay the foundation for a safe and innovative future for AI. 

Read the full MOU here.