USITC Releases USTR-Requested Report on U.S. Aluminum and Steel Emissions Intensities - U.S. International Trade Commission

The U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC) today released a U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)-requested report that calculates the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensities of U.S. steel and aluminum industries. The report, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensities of the U.S. Steel and Aluminum Industries at the Product Level, was requested by the USTR in a letter received on June 5, 2023. 

USTR’s request letter asked the USITC to:

• Calculate the GHG emissions intensity of steel and aluminum produced in the United States by product category in 2022, with data on scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. 
• Describe the methodologies the USITC used to collect relevant information and calculate the emissions intensity estimates.
• Identify where emissions occur during manufacturing, with respect to the production stages and sourcing location of inputs. 

To gather data for the calculation of product-level emissions intensity estimates, the USITC surveyed all U.S. facilities that produced the steel and aluminum products covered under the section 232 investigation in 2022.

This report conveys the Commission’s factual findings and analyses. The Commission makes no recommendations on policy or other matters in this report. 

Major Findings of the Investigation

The processes and inputs used in U.S. steel and aluminum production drive their emission intensities.

Semifinished Steel

The average emissions intensity estimate for U.S. carbon and other alloy semifinished steel was 1.02 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per metric ton of steel (mt CO2e/mt steel) in 2022.

• The emissions intensities estimates of U.S. carbon and alloy steel products are primarily influenced by two factors: 
• The production pathway (the more emissions-intensive blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace, or BF-BOF, pathway, versus the electric arc furnace, or EAF, pathway) used to produce the semifinished steel, which is used as substrate in mill products.
• The relative use of emissions-intensive upstream material inputs like pig iron and direct reduced iron.
• The average emissions intensity for U.S. stainless steel semifinished steel was 2.23 mt CO2e/mt steel in 2022. The emissions intensity of U.S. stainless steel products is mainly influenced by the reliance on emissions-intensive ferroalloy (an alloy of iron with a significant amount of one or more other elements, like chromium or nickel) inputs. All U.S. stainless semifinished steel-producing facilities reported operating an EAF. Therefore, variation in the production pathway does not drive emissions intensities for stainless steel.

Steel Mill Products

Average emissions intensities among carbon and alloy steel mill products ranged between 0.67 mt CO2e/mt steel for hot-worked long products and 2.17 mt CO2e/mt steel for coated flat products. Average emissions intensities among stainless steel mill products ranged between 2.31 mt CO2e/mt steel for hot-rolled flat and 4.55 mt CO2e/mt steel for wire.

• Further downstream steel products generally had higher emissions intensities than less-processed steel products. This is because each subsequent process in steel production involves more steps and therefore more opportunities for emissions.
• For carbon and alloy steel mill products, the most emissions-intensive processes in the U.S. steel industry occur during the upstream production of pig iron and semifinished steel. The additional subprocesses used to produce downstream products are also significant, however, leading to meaningful differences in emissions intensities across the carbon and alloy steel product categories.
• Stainless steel mill products are more emissions intensive than their carbon and alloy steel counterparts. This is due to the heavier use of energy and ferroalloys associated with stainless steel production.

Unwrought Aluminum

The average emissions intensity for all U.S. unwrought aluminum is 3.46 mt CO2e/mt aluminum. U.S. unwrought aluminum includes primary aluminum, which is produced from alumina at smelters using electrolysis, and secondary aluminum, which is produced by remelting primary aluminum and scrap-based inputs. Most U.S. unwrought production, in terms of volume and number of facilities, is of secondary unwrought aluminum.

• The average emissions intensity for U.S. primary unwrought aluminum is 14.52 mt CO2e/mt aluminum. The main drivers of the emissions intensity of primary unwrought aluminum are:
• The large quantities of electricity needed for electrolysis. 
• The fuel mix used to generate high quantities of the necessary electricity.
• The average emissions intensity for U.S. secondary unwrought aluminum is 2.46 mt CO2e/mt aluminum. Production of secondary unwrought aluminum is much less energy intensive, using a fraction of the electricity of primary unwrought production. The emissions intensity of secondary unwrought aluminum is influenced by the amount of primary unwrought aluminum versus scrap used as inputs and, to a lesser extent, by the efficiency of the furnaces used to heat the metal.

Wrought Aluminum

The average emissions intensities for U.S. wrought aluminum products ranged from 4.97 mt CO2e/mt aluminum for plates, sheets and strip, to 8.66 mt CO2e/mt aluminum for foil. The two main factors that drive the differences in emissions intensities between wrought product categories are the:

• Amount of primary versus secondary unwrought aluminum used. 
• Energy intensity of the various manufacturing processes.

Note: The Commission’s emissions intensity estimates for both steel and aluminum are calculated assuming that scrap inputs have zero embedded emissions.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensities of the U.S. Steel and Aluminum Industries at the Product Level (Investigation No. 332-598, USITC Publication 5584, February 2025) is available on the USITC website at https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5584.pdf.

About Factfinding Investigations

USITC general factfinding investigations culminating in a report, such as this one, cover matters related to tariffs, trade and competitiveness and are generally conducted under section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 at the request of the U.S. Trade Representative, the House Committee on Ways and Means or the Senate Committee on Finance. The resulting reports convey the Commission’s objective findings and independent analyses on the subjects investigated. The Commission makes no recommendations on policy or other matters in its general factfinding reports. Upon completion of each investigation, the USITC submits its findings and analyses to the requester. General factfinding investigation reports are subsequently released to the public unless they are classified by the requester for national security reasons.
 

USTR Seeks Public Comment on Proposed Actions in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance - Office of U.S. International Trade Representative

Washington, DC – The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is inviting comments from the public on proposed Section 301 actions aimed to obtain the elimination of China’s acts, policies, and practices targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. In this Section 301 investigation, USTR has found China’s acts, policies, and practices to be unreasonable and to burden or restrict US commerce.

To obtain the elimination of China’s acts, policies, and practices, and in light of China’s market power over global supply, pricing, and access in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors, USTR proposes to impose certain fees and restrictions on international maritime transport services related to Chinese ship operators and Chinese-built ships, as well as to promote the transport of U.S. goods on U.S. vessels.  USTR invites comments from any interested person on the proposed actions.

USTR will hold a public hearing about the proposed actions on March 24, 2025, in the main hearing room at the International Trade Commission.

The deadline to submit a request to appear at the hearing is March 10, 2025.

The deadline for submission of comments is March 24, 2025.

To view the Federal Register Notice, click here. 

Background

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Trade Act), is designed to address unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. commerce.  The Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act provide a domestic procedure through which interested persons may petition the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government act, policy, or practice and take appropriate action.  Section 301(b) may be used to respond to unreasonable or discriminatory foreign government acts, policies, and practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.

On March 12, 2024, five national labor unions filed a petition requesting an investigation into the acts, policies, and practices of China targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance.  The five petitioner unions are:

• the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO CLC (“USW”);
• the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”);
• the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO/CLC (“IBB”);
• the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”); and
• the Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO (“MTD”).

The petition was filed pursuant to Section 302(a)(1) of the Trade Act, requesting action pursuant to Section 301(b).

Pursuant to Section 302(a)(2) of the Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative reviewed the allegations in the petition and determined to initiate an investigation regarding the issues raised in the petition.  On April 17, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the government of China. 

In light of the information obtained during the investigation and taking into account public comments, as well as the advice of the interagency Section 301 Committee and advisory committees, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that China’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act.  The U.S. Trade Representative found that China’s targeting for dominance is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.

Specifically, USTR found China’s targeting for dominance unreasonable because it displaces foreign firms, deprives market-oriented businesses and their workers of commercial opportunities, and lessens competition and creates dependencies on China, increasing risk and reducing supply chain resilience. China’s targeting for dominance is also unreasonable because of Beijing’s extraordinary control over its economic actors and these sectors.

USTR found that China’s targeting for dominance burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by undercutting business opportunities for and investments in the U.S. maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors; restricting competition and choice; creating economic security risks from dependence and vulnerabilities in sectors critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy; and undermining supply chain resilience.

A copy of the petition and other public documents associated with this investigation are available here. USTR’s public report on the investigation is available here, and the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination is available here.
 

Federal Register Notices:

• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations Orders or Reviews: Vertical Metal File Cabinets From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Glass Wine Bottles From China and Mexico
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Stainless Steel Flanges From India: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Changed Circumstances Review
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Motorized Self-Balancing Vehicles; Notice of Institution of Investigation
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Laminated Woven Sacks From the People's Republic of China: Continuation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders
• Certain Steel Nails From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Alloy and Certain Carbon Steel Threaded Rod From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From Canada: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination; Correction
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: In the Matter of Certain Electronic Computing Devices and Components Thereof; Notice of Request for Submissions on the Public Interest
• Certain Stilbenic Optical Brightening Agents From China and Taiwan
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Sodium Nitrite From the People's Republic of China: Continuation of Countervailing Duty Order
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Tungsten Shot From China; Scheduling of the Final Phase of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Duty Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Vertical Metal File Cabinets From China; Scheduling of Expedited Five-Year Reviews
   

$1.4M in Fake Sports Merchandise Seized by Cincinnati CBP - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

Port of CINCINNATI – Last month leading up to Super Bowl LIX, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers in Cincinnati seized 85 shipments containing over 4,000 pieces of counterfeit sports merchandise and memorabilia. If the merchandise—which primarily came from China and Hong Kong—had been genuine, its Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) would have been over $1.43 million.

During the week of January 27, officers inspected packages during an operation focusing on counterfeit sports merchandise and memorabilia such as jerseys, hats, coins, jewelry, footwear, and bags. Among the 85 shipments that were seized, 30 of those held counterfeit NFL, MLB and MLS jerseys with an astounding total value of $232,000, had the goods been genuine. These packages contained merchandise that infringed on the protected trademarks of professional sports teams such as Detroit Lions, Baltimore Ravens, Kansas City Chiefs, Al-Nassr FC, Atlanta Braves, and Seattle Mariners to name a few.

“I’m extremely proud of our officers’ determination in stopping illicit shipments, and our commitment to protecting the American economy,” said LaFonda D. Sutton-Burke, Director, Field Operations, Chicago Field Office. “Shipments like these prey on the many sports fans across the nation who may be tricked into paying high prices for these inferior products.”

One of the shipments discovered by officers contained 156 NFL Baltimore Ravens jerseys enroute to a residence in Jensen Beach, Florida. Officers determined the jerseys to be counterfeit based upon several factors including the routing, cheap materials used, lack of fine details, and packaging. Had the jerseys been authentic, the MSRP would have been over $27,000.

Another shipment was intercepted that held 80 NFL Las Vegas Raiders memorabilia coins. The coins were destined to a residence located in Eglin AFB, Florida. If the counterfeit coins—which came from Hong Kong— had they been genuine, their MSRP would have been $3,200.

All the merchandise seized were determined to be counterfeit by CBP’s Centers for Excellence and Expertise, the agency’s trade experts.

“CBP promotes fair and compliant trade,” said Cincinnati Port Director Eric Zizelman. “Buying these dupes not only supports criminal organizations but defrauds legitimate American businesses. Our officers here in Cincinnati work 24 hours a day detecting and intercepting threats on American consumers.”

CBP provides basic import information about admissibility requirements and the clearance process for e-commerce goods and encourages buyers to confirm that their purchases and the importation of those purchases comply with state and federal import regulations.

The dangers of buying counterfeit products aren’t always obvious to consumers. Particularly, when shopping online, beware of counterfeit goods. Fake goods can lead to real dangers. For more information, visit The Truth Behind Counterfeits page.

Suspected intellectual property rights violations, fraud, or illegal trade activity can be reported by contacting CBP through the e-Allegations Online Trade Violations Reporting System or by calling 1-800-BE-ALERT. Violations can also be reported to the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center at https://www.iprcenter.gov/referral/ or by telephone at 1-866-IPR-2060.
 

CBP Birmingham Intercepts 200,000 Counterfeit U.S. Forever Stamps - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

BIRMINGHAM, AL – U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations at the Port of Birmingham led to a large seizure of counterfeit U.S. Forever Stamps, preventing hundreds of thousands of fraudulent stamps from entering postal circulation.

The Port of Birmingham operation resulted in the seizure of 200,0000 counterfeit U.S. Forever Stamps from Hong Kong, with a suggested retail price of $146,000.

During an operation at a local sorting facility, CBP officers selected two packages for inspection based on specific criteria. Upon inspection, the packages’ contents looked authentic but further examination revealed the stamps inside were deemed counterfeit and in violation of multiple Intellectual Property Right (IPR) laws.

CBP officers are highly trained to detect and identify IPR violations to protect the American public. Counterfeit goods harm consumers, retailers, trademark holders, and the U.S. economy.

“Protecting America begins with the shared commitment and determination of dedicated CBP Officers, Agriculture Specialists, and support staff. Together, they play a vital role in safeguarding consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods. Economic security is national security.” Said Steve Robinson, CBP Birmingham Port Director.

While counterfeiting is a worldwide issue, China and Hong Kong accounted for approximately 90% of the total CBP IPR quantity seized in FY24.

CBP continues working with Homeland Security Investigations agents and U.S. Postal Inspectors to halt attempts to unlawfully import counterfeit U.S. Forever Stamps.

CBP's border security mission is led at our nation’s Ports of Entry by CBP officers and agriculture specialists from the Office of Field Operations. CBP screens international travelers and cargo and searches for illicit narcotics, unreported currency, weapons, counterfeit consumer goods, prohibited agriculture, invasive weeds and pests, and other illicit products that could potentially harm the American public, U.S. businesses, and our nation’s safety and economic vitality.
 

Treasury Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran’s Shadow Fleet as Part of Maximum Pressure Campaign - U.S. Department of Treasury

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the U.S. Department of State are imposing sanctions on over 30 persons and vessels in multiple jurisdictions for their role in brokering the sale and transportation of Iranian petroleum-related products. Among those sanctioned today are oil brokers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Hong Kong, tanker operators and mangers in India and People’s Republic of China (PRC), the head of Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company, and the Iranian Oil Terminals Company, whose operations help finance Iran’s destabilizing activities. The vessels sanctioned today are responsible for shipping tens of millions of barrels of crude oil valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

“Iran continues to rely on a shadowy network of vessels, shippers, and brokers to facilitate its oil sales and fund its destabilizing activities,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The United States will use all our available tools to target all aspects of Iran’s oil supply chain, and anyone who deals in Iranian oil exposes themselves to significant sanctions risk.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Orders 13902 and 13846, which target Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and marks the second round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025, ordering a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran and to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. 

OVERSIGHT OF IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS

Hamid Bovard serves as Iran’s Deputy Minister of Petroleum and chief executive officer of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is responsible for the exploration, production, refining, and export of oil and petroleum products in Iran. Through its direct oversight of Iran’s oil industry, NIOC plays a key role in underwriting the regionally destabilizing activities of Iran’s military and its proxy groups, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The Iranian government allocates billions of dollars’ worth of oil each year to its armed forces to supplement their annual budget allocations.   

NIOC was designated pursuant to counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224, as amended, on October 26, 2020, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. 

The Iran-based Iranian Oil Terminals Company (IOTC), managed by Abbass Asadrouz, is a NIOC subsidiary that oversees all operations at Iran’s oil terminals, including Kharg Island Oil Terminal, through which a majority of Iranian oil flows, and South Pars Condensate Terminal, which accounts for 100 percent of Iran’s gas condensate exports. Sayyed Ali Miri and Gholamhossein Gerami manage the Kharg Island Oil Terminal and South Pars Condensate Terminal, respectively. Iran’s remaining oil exports depart from terminals along the Caspian Sea, including the North Oil Terminal, headed by Ali Moalemi. 

Hamid Bovard and the Iranian Oil Terminals Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Sayyed Ali Miri, Ali Moalemi, Gholamhossein Gerami, and Abbass Asadrouz are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, IOTC. 

OIL BROKERS

Iran relies on brokers outside of Iran to facilitate the sale and transport of its crude oil to end users abroad, largely in the UAE and PRC. UAE-based Petroquimico FZE has purchased tens of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum products from NIOC. In November 2024, Petroquimico FZE used the Barbados-flagged CASINOVA, which is also known as YING GE, (IMO: 9280366), owned, managed, and operated by Liberia-based Le Monde Marine Services Limited, to transport over 200,000 barrels of Iranian oil to the UAE. 

Similarly, Hong Kong-based oil broker Petronix Energy Trading Limited (Petronix Energy) has purchased hundreds of thousands of metric tons of Iranian oil from sanctioned Naftiran Intertrade Company, the marketing arm of NIOC, for onward shipment to the PRC. In 2024, Petronix Energy used the Panama-flagged MENG XIN (IMO 9271406) and the Cook Islands-flagged PHOENIX I (IMO 9236248), both of which are being identified by the State Department as blocked property today, to transport the oil.

Petroquimico FZE, Petronix Energy, and Le Monde Marine Services Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. The CASINOVA is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as property in which Le Monde Marine Services Limited has an interest.

SHADOW FLEET OIL SHIPMENTS

Sanctioned Iranian tankers rely on ship-to-ship transfers outside of jurisdictional port limits with non-sanctioned vessels to transport petroleum to foreign customers, obfuscating the oil’s Iranian origin. In September 2024, the Panama-flagged URGANE I (IMO: 9231901), managed and operated by PRC-based Nycity Shipmanagement Co Ltd (Nycity Shipmanagement), loaded Iranian Pars crude oil via a ship-to-ship transfer with a tanker owned by the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company. URGANE I has transported multiple Iranian petroleum shipments to the PRC. Like Nycity Shipmanagement, India-based Flux Maritime LLP has served as the technical manager of a vessel that loaded hundreds of thousands of barrels of heavy Iranian crude oil via a ship-to-ship transfer.

Flux Maritime LLP and Nycity Shipmanagement Co Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s petroleum sector. The URGANE I is being identified as property in which Nycity Shipmanagement Co Ltd has an interest.

The Panama-flagged tankers LYDIA II (IMO: 9365776), AYDEN (IMO: 9365764), and FIONA (IMO: 9365752) have transported multiple shipments of Iranian oil to refineries in the PRC. Seychelles-based shell companies Sunny Land Trading Ltd, Green Garden Trading Ltd, and Artemis Heart Ltd serve as the owners, managers, and operators of the LYDIA II, the AYDEN, and the FIONA, respectively.

Sunny Land Trading Ltd, Green Garden Ltd, and Artemis Heart Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902, for operating in petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. The LYDIA II is being identified as property in which Sunny Land Trading Ltd has an interest. The AYDEN is being identified as property in which Green Garden Trading Ltd has an interest. The FIONA is being identified as property in which Artemis Heart Ltd has an interest.

STATE DEPARTMENT DESIGNATIONS

The U.S. Department of State is designating eight entities based in Iran, India, Malaysia, Seychelles, and the UAE for their involvement in the sale, purchase, and transportation of Iranian petroleum. Additionally, eight vessels are being identified as blocked property in which these entities have an interest.

Iran-based Kangan Petro Refining Company; India-based BSM Marine Limited Liability Partnership, Austinship Management Private Limited, Cosmos Lines Inc; UAE-based Alkonost Maritime DMCC and Octane Energy Group FZCO; Malaysia-based IMS Ltd; and Seychelles-based Oceanend Shipping Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O 13846 for having knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran. 

The Gabon-flagged YATEEKA (IMO: 9191553) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which BSM Marine Limited Liability Partnership has an interest. The Cook Islands-flagged MENG XIN (IMO: 9271406) and PHOENIX I (IMO: 9236248) are being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which Alkonost Maritime DMCC has an interest. The Eswatini-flagged AMAK (IMO: 9244635) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which Austinship Management Private Limited has an interest. The Panama-flagged VIOLET 1 (IMO: 9154000), PETERPAUL (IMO: 9163269) and CHAMTANG (IMO: 9212400) are being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which IMS Ltd has an interest. The Gambia-flagged ASTERIX (IMO: 9181194) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which Oceanend Shipping Ltd has an interest. 

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated person(s) described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is/are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines  provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.

View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.