Sanctioning a China-Based “Teapot” Refinery to Pressure Iran Further - U.S. Department of State

The United States is today sanctioning Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd, a China-based independent “teapot” refinery, for purchasing more than a billion dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil. The President is committed to drive Iran’s illicit oil exports, including to China, to zero.

The United States is also imposing sanctions on several companies and vessels involved in facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s “shadow” fleet. This is the United States’ second action against an independent China-based teapot refinery since President Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025.

All sanctions will be fully enforced under the Trump Administration’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran.

As Long as Iran attempts to generate oil revenues to fund its destabilizing activities, the United States will hold both Iran and all its partners in sanctions evasion accountable.

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and marks the sixth round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025. For more information on today’s actions, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release.
 

Federal Register Notices:

• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Spain: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Raw Honey From Argentina: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2023
• Certain Cold-Drawn Mechanical Tubing of Carbon and Alloy Steel From India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Raw Honey From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2023
• Polypropylene Corrugated Boxes From the People's Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation
• Raw Honey From Brazil: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2021-2023
• Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 From India: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Determinations, Investigations, etc.: Polypropylene Corrugated Boxes From the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Alkyl Phosphate Esters From China; Cancellation of Hearing for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Eye Cosmetics and Packaging Therefor; Notice of Commission Final Determination; Issuance of a Limited Exclusion Order; Termination of Investigation
• Certain Disposable Vaporizer Devices and Components and Packaging Thereof; Notice of a Commission Determination Not To Review Initial Determination Terminating the Investigation; Termination of Investigation
• Certain Audio Players and Components Thereof (I); Notice of Commission Determination To Review in Part an Initial Determination Granting Summary Determination of Invalidity and Terminating the Investigation for Good Cause; Termination of Investigation
• Rescission of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Slag Pots From the People's Republic of China: Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Final Less-Than-Fair-Value Determination
• Glycine From India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Melamine From the People's Republic of China: Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2023-2024
• Fiberglass Door Panels From the People's Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc." Certain Products Containing Tirzepatide and Products Purporting To Contain Tirzepatide; Notice of Issuance of a General Exclusion Order, a Limited Exclusion Order, and Cease and Desist Orders; Termination of the Investigation
• Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Semiconductors and Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
• Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Strontium Chromate From Austria and France: Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders
• Certain Metal Lockers and Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Final Determination of No Shipments; 2022-2023
• Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From the Republic of Korea: Final Results and Partial Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Uncovered Innerspring Units From the People's Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and South Africa: Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders
   

FTC Launches Public Inquiry into Anti-Competitive Regulations - Federal Trade Commission

Today (4/14/25), the Federal Trade Commission launched a public inquiry into the impact of federal regulations on competition, with the goal of identifying and reducing anticompetitive regulatory barriers. The FTC launched this inquiry in response to President Trump’s Executive Order on Reducing Anticompetitive Regulatory Barriers.

Per the Executive Order, the Trump-Vance FTC will be on the front lines of advancing the President’s agenda to revitalize the American economy. The FTC seeks to identify unnecessary regulations that exclude new market entrants, protect dominant incumbents, and predetermine economic winners and losers.

“Regulations that reduce competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation can hamper the American economy,” said FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson. “These need to be eliminated or modified to revitalize a competitive market.” 

In a Request for Information, the FTC invites members of the public to comment on how federal regulations can harm competition in the American economy. The RFI seeks to understand what federal regulations have an anticompetitive effect. Members of the public—including consumers, workers, businesses, start-ups, potential market entrants, investors, and academics—are encouraged to comment.

The public will have 40 days to submit comments at Regulations.gov, no later than May 27, 2025. Once submitted, comments will be posted to Regulations.gov.

Comments submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice Anticompetitive Regulations Task Force at Regulations.gov that contain information falling within the scope of the FTC’s RFI do not need to be resubmitted in response to the FTC’s RFI. 

The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers.  The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers or file an antitrust complaint.  For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social media, subscribe to press releases and read our blog.
 

CBP Announces Global Entry Partnership with El Salvador - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

WASHINGTON —U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced today that El Salvador is now an official Global Entry partner country, marking a significant step in strengthening travel and security collaboration between the two nations, and making El Salvador one of 20 partner countries whose citizens can apply for Global Entry membership.

“With over 1 million travelers entering the United States each day, this agreement reflects our shared commitment to safe and efficient travel for both of our countries,” said Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. “This partnership with El Salvador will enhance the speed and accuracy of the arrival process, while protecting national security at the same time.”

Global Entry partnerships enhance security and promote bilateral trade, tourism, and cultural exchange by allowing pre-vetted, low-risk citizens of El Salvador expedited customs and immigration processing upon arrival to the United States. Salvadoran Global Entry applicants will undergo rigorous and recurring vetting by both the U.S. and Salvadoran authorities, including an in-person interview by a CBP Officer before initial enrollment. To maintain low-risk traveler status, Global Entry members must not violate any of the program’s terms and conditions. Program violations will result in appropriate enforcement action and termination of the traveler’s membership privileges.  

“This new Global Entry partnership with the United States marks a significant milestone for both countries. By granting Salvadoran citizens access to expedited processing, we not only strengthen our economic ties and create new investment opportunities but also enhance the security of our borders. This collaboration reflects both countries' commitment to strengthen bond and joint efforts, benefiting Salvadorans and Americans alike,” said President Nayib Bukele.

Global Entry is one of CBP’s four Trusted Traveler Programs, with millions of travelers benefiting from its expedited entry services every year. Approved members have the option of using the Global Entry Mobile application to digitally confirm their Global Entry membership upon arrival to the U.S., further streamlining and expediting the entry process.  The program also provides access to TSA PreCheck® for eligible members, offering quicker security screening for domestic travelers at participating U.S. airports.

Additional Global Entry partner countries include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Japan, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. 
 

Operation Stops Over 70 Shipments of Counterfeit Human Growth Hormones and Other Dangerous Chemicals - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

CHICAGO — U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers stationed in Chicago intercepted 71 shipments containing dangerous chemicals during an operation involving five Ports of Entry and two international airports from March 16 to 22, 2025.

During this operation, officers from the Office of Field Operations (OFO) were focused on identifying and intercepting precursor chemical shipments arriving in the Mail, Express Consignment, and Air Cargo environments. OFO had identified a significant increase of precursor chemical seizures over the last six months. Precursor chemical seizures in the Mail, Express Consignment, and Air Cargo environments have seen a significant increase in fiscal year 2025 with 151 seizures from October to December (2024) alone, compared to a total of 132 seizures in all fiscal year 2024 (October 2023-September 2024).

During the operation, Chicago CBP identified high-risk shipments and seized 67 shipments of Human Growth Hormones and Steroids, 3 shipments of precursor chemicals, and 1 shipment of 4-Butanediol. Most of these shipments originated from Hong Kong and were destined for different cities within the U.S. Most of the shipments were being sent under the master carton smuggling scheme. A master shipment can have several smaller preaddressed unmanifested or mis-manifested parcels which would later be sent through a domestic carrier.

“The work of our officers has been incredible and their dedication to CBP's enforcement mission is evident when you look at these seizures,” said LaFonda D. Sutton-Burke, Director, Field Operations, Chicago Field Office. “Bad shippers are persistent in their attempts to smuggle dangerous goods into the United States, however, through our hard work and vigilance we will continue to intercept these illicit substances at our port of entry before they can harm our communities."

The other locations participating in this operation included John F. Kennedy International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, Port of Memphis. Port of Louisville, Port of Indianapolis, and Port of Cincinnati.

CBP’s border security mission is led at 328 ports of entry by CBP officers from the Office of Field Operations. Follow Chicago CBP on X @CBPChicago and @DFOChicago. Visit CBP’s YouTube channel to learn more about how CBP’s Office of Field Operations secures our nation’s borders.
 

Treasury Increases Pressure on Chinese Importers of Iranian Oil - U.S. Department of Treasury 

WASHINGTON — Today (4/16/25), the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating a China-based independent “teapot” refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. for its role in purchasing more than a billion dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, including from a front company for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).  OFAC is also imposing additional sanctions on several companies and vessels responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.”  

“Any refinery, company, or broker that chooses to purchase Iranian oil or facilitate Iran’s oil trade places itself at serious risk,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.  “The United States is committed to disrupting all actors providing support to Iran’s oil supply chain, which the regime uses to support its terrorist proxies and partners.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and is OFAC’s second action against a teapot refinery that has purchased Iranian crude oil.  This also marks the sixth round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), instituting a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran.

OFAC is also issuing an updated sanctions advisory to assist the global shipping and maritime industry in identifying sanctions evasion practices related to the shipment of Iranian-origin petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products and in implementing sanctions compliance best practices to guard against such sanctions risks.

INDEPENDENT REFIINERY PURCHASING IRANIAN OIL
Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. (Shandong Shengxing) is an independent teapot refinery in Shandong Province that has received dozens of shipments of Iranian crude oil worth more than a billion dollars from shadow fleet vessels, some of which have been sanctioned for their role transporting Iranian petroleum, including the newly sanctioned NYANTARA (IMO 9242120), RESTON (IMO 9265744), and the recently sanctioned BRAVA LAKE (IMO 9232876). 

Between March 2020 and January 2023, Shandong Shengxing sent more than $800 million in wire transfers to China Oil and Petroleum Company Limited (COPC).  COPC was an IRGC-QF front company that aided in selling Iranian oil to China.  COPC laundered billions through the U.S. financial system in support of the IRGC-QF, $108 million of which was seized by the U.S. Justice Department.

Shandong Shengxing is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. 

MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE SHADOW FLEET 
Iran relies on a network of opaque ownership and ship management companies to manage a shadow fleet of tankers that conduct ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate Iran’s petroleum shipments to China.  The Cameroon-flagged RESTON (IMO 9265744), and the Panama-flagged BESTLA (IMO 9295593), EGRET (IMO 9283801), NYANTARA (IMO 9242120), and RANI (IMO 9250907), have shipped billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil, including to China-based refineries, generating vital revenue for the Iranian regime and its proxies.  

In early 2025, the RESTON received more than one million barrels of Iranian oil from ship-to-ship transfers involving sanctioned tankers, including the WEN YAO (IMO 9288095) and FIONA (IMO 9365752), which were sanctioned on October 11, 2024 and February 24, 2025, respectively.  

In early 2025, the BESTLA received approximately two million barrels of Iranian oil via a ship-to-ship transfer from the sanctioned vessel ATILA (IMO 9233753), which was previously known as the HECATE and sanctioned on April 4, 2024 for its role shipping Iranian oil involving Iranian military front company Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars. 

Also in early 2025, EGRET conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of Iranian oil from the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) tanker DUNE (IMO 9569712) near Indonesian waters. 

Lastly, in early 2025, the NYANTARA received hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil from the SALVIA (IMO 9569700), which was sanctioned on October 11, 2024.  The RANI also received hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil from sanctioned NITC tanker DERYA (IMO 9569700), before delivering the oil to China in early 2025. 

Panama-based Oceanic Orbit Incorporated is the owner of the RESTON, while Malaysia-based Pro Mission SDN BHD is the ship manager, operator, and technical manager of the RESTON.  Marshall Islands-based Bestla Company Limited is the registered owner, ship manager, and commercial operator of the BESTLA.  Hong Kong-based Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited is the registered owner of the EGRET.  Panama-based Civic Capital Shipping Inc., Starboard Shipping Inc., and Oceanic Orbit Incorporated are the registered owners of the NYANTARA, RANI, and RESTON, respectively. 

OFAC is designating Oceanic Orbit Incorporated, Pro Mission SDN BHD, Bestla Company Limited, Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited, Civic Capital Shipping Inc., and Starboard Shipping Inc. pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.  

OFAC is identifying RESTON, BESTLA, EGRET, NYANTARA, and RANI as blocked property in which Oceanic Orbit Incorporated, Bestla Company Limited, Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited, Civic Capital Shipping Inc., and Starboard Shipping Inc. have an interest, respectively.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.

Click here for information on the entities designated and vessels identified today.